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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5860  
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY  
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 1827  
RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY 0153  
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA PRIORITY 0215  
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA PRIORITY 0273  
RUEHGO/AMEMBASSY RANGOON PRIORITY 0044  
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 2748

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2016  
TAGS: [PREL](#) [PHUM](#) [UNSC](#) [BM](#) [RS](#)  
SUBJECT: MFA NEGATIVE ON UNSC BURMA RESOLUTION  
  
REF: STATE 197809

Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells. Reasons: 1.4(B/D).

11. (C) In a December 14 discussion about reftel draft UNSCR, Vladimir Safronkov, Chief of the UN Political Affairs Section in the MFA's International Organizations Department, told us Russia's initial reaction was negative. He acknowledged Russia had its own concerns about the situation in Burma and that U/SYG Gambari had asked for Security Council support. However, the text went beyond supporting the mission and strayed into making far-reaching assessments. Reiterating that the GOR did not consider the situation in Burma to pose a threat to international peace and security, he stressed that the draft text was "too much, too soon."

12. (C) Safronkov suggested that the U.S. and other sponsors first consider a Presidential Statement before seeking a resolution and try to engage incoming SYG Ban Ki-Moon. He noted that there were timing issues with seeking adoption in December, since this left at best a week to work on the draft. The GOR was going to consult with the Chinese, who he thought would oppose the text.  
RUSSELL